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Immediately after the Second World War, I had the opportunity of meeting
O¯kubo Tomejiro¯ [大久保留次郎], the man allegedly responsible for manufacturing
rumors about a Korean riot and for causing the subsequent mass murder of
Koreans in 1923.  O¯kubo, who was a minor official —— a subordinate of Mizuno
Rentaro¯ [水野錬太郎 Home Minister] —— in the Home Ministry at the time of the
earthquake, did not deny it.  Although O¯kubo did not deny having started the
1923 riot and the murder of Koreans, he replied that he had no alternative in
order to maintain Japanese safety.  O¯kubo continued saying that if he had not
done it, a revolution might have occurred in Japan.
Shin Hong-shick 申鴻 , 1983. 1)
Introduction
From today’s viewpoint, the persecution of Koreans following the Great Kanto 2)
Earthquake of 1923 might be judged as a ‘crime against humanity.’  Owing to
unsubstantiated reports about a Korean riot circulated following the earthquake,
members of the Japanese army, police, and a number of vigilante corps lost their cools
and embarked upon a relentless hunt for any Koreans who might be responsible for the
reported riots.  As a result, over 6,000 innocent Korean residents were killed.
In the early morning of 1 September, heavy rain, accompanied by a south wind, hit
the Tokyo and Kanagawa regions.  The rain finally stopped at about 10:00 a.m., and a
bright sun appeared in the sky.  As noon approached, housewives were busy preparing
lunch as usual.  At approximately two minutes before noon, a series of violent tremors
registering as much as 7.9 on the Richter scale suddenly hit much of the densely
populated and heavily industrialised areas of the Kanto region.  The total number of
deaths attributed to the earthquake and the subsequent fires reached 91,224 and an
estimated 381,090 houses were entirely burnt to the ground. 3) The damage to
government and other public offices densely concentrated in the Tokyo metropolis was
also significant.  It ranged from the Department of Home Ministry to the Tokyo
Metropolitan Police Department and the Central Telegraph Office, and to many
foreign embassies in the area.  The government thus virtually ceased to exist.
It was in the midst of this devastation that rumors about a Korean riot began to
circulate among the masses.  Faced with widespread rumors about Koreans setting
fires, poisoning wells and throwing bombs, in the afternoon of 2 September 1923, the
Japanese government imposed “martial law” (kaigen rei 戒厳令) on both the “City of
Tokyo” (To¯kyo¯shi 東京市) and the five surrounding districts to maintain public order
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and peace. 4) The area affected by martial law was extended to adjacent prefectures
over the following days, but the actions of the civilian and military leadership added to
the already confused situation in the devastated area.  They lent credence to the
unsubstantiated reports of Korean uprisings and fostered their dissemination. 5) These
actions caused anti-Korean feelings to erupt throughout the country: not only did they
lead to a proliferation of vigilante corps throughout much of the Kanto region, but they
also became the defining factors in transforming already existing social groups whose
principal object was caring for victims of the earthquake into ‘armed mobs.’ 6)
Checkpoints manned by soldiers and members of these vigilante corps were
established in many cities to investigate the movement of Korean subjects.  Language
was the main criterion used to distinguish Koreans from Japanese.  Any trace of a
Korean accent marked a person for extermination.  Some Koreans were haunted and
slaughtered on the streets, while others were harassed in police stations or other places
of relative safety in the name of protective custody.
What or who was responsible for starting rumors about Korean rioting?  Rumors of
a Korean riot provided the immediate cause of the mass murder that followed.  Thus
any study of this atrocity must examine the origin of reports about violent acts by
Koreans.  This attempt, however, seems almost impossible, for the Korean rumor
might have its origin in more than two people. 7) Not only is it likely that each rumor
developed independently and became a torrent of the Korean rumors throughout the
country, but one can just as well infer that anti-Korean rumors were already
widespread in the general public before the authorities facilitated their dissemination.
Investigations into the root-cause of the Korean rumors cannot be accomplished
satisfactorily until the sufficient evidence shed new light on the question.
On the other hand, analysis of the actions taken by the civilian and military
leadership during the first critical days following the earthquake leads us to become
suspicious about the involvement of the Japanese government in the Korean affairs.  As
will be examined, the theory of a government plot —— that the Japanese elite
intentionally manufactured and circulated anti-Korean rumors in the interests of the
government —— is highly possible because: ① the Japanese elite tended to define
Koreans as both to be biased and feared; ② their steps to sanction unsubstantiated
reports of a Korean riot operated in such a way as to enrol the Japanese public in the
service of the authorities and played it off against the whole Korean community in
Japan; ③ thus the Japanese government was able to prevent a perceived repetition of
popular uprisings; ④ after the incident, the high-ranking officials tried to create and
disseminate an impression that Koreans had actually engaged in disturbing acts of
violence. 8) The evidence does not point to the government’s conspiracy theory, but
given these facts, one can argue that anti-Korean rumors took shape in official
resentment toward Koreans, rather than merely being a spontaneous generation among
the general public.
Despite considerable research into the massacre of the Koreans in September 1923,
the issue of the root-cause of Korean rumors has rarely been treated as a major topic by
academics.  Many scholars apply the theory of a government plot to explain the
question, but left open wide scope for further research into the subject. 9) This has left a
void in the historiography of the Korean community in Japan.  Analysis of official
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resentment toward Koreans and their actions during the first critical days following the
earthquake enables us to provide a more convincing explanation of how anti-Korean
rumors took shape in official minds.  This article is an attempt to fill that void and
illuminate much about the theory of a government plot.  It will be argued that the
Japanese elite tended to define the Koreans as both to be despised and feared and these
strong anti-Korean sentiments contributed to their willingness to use rumors about
Korean uprisings.  Drawing extensively on the varied contemporary discourses, which
clearly express official resentment toward Koreans, this article raises important
questions about how the authorities came to embrace anti-Korean rumors, which set off
the massacre of Korean residents in Japan.
Prejudice and Fear
Despite the brief reign of Emperor Taisho 大正天皇 (1912–1926), this era became
famous as it encompassed enormous social and economic changes throughout Japan.
From a small agricultural nation, Japan suddenly rose, within just one generation, to
become East Asia’s first modern power.  In addition, joining the allies in the First
World War against Germany in 1914 allowed Japan to seize German-held territories in
China and the Pacific and the war-industry boom helped to give her an opportunity to
enter easily into the colonial markets of Asia, which had been cut off from Europe.  By
the end of the First World War, Japan had successfully established her empire over
East Asia, stretching from Taiwan to the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin and Manchuria,
including Korea, which was annexed in 1910.  Japan’s dreams of becoming a rich
nation with strong army ( fukoku kyo¯hei富国強兵) seemed to come true.
However, the years that followed the First World War were disappointing to the
Japanese government.  The outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the
subsequent Rice Riots (Komeso¯do¯ 米騒動) in Japan the following year 10) seemed to both
Japanese imperialists and capitalists to be events that fundamentally threatened Japan’s
Imperial System (Tenno¯sei 天皇制).  In addition, the March First Korean Independence
Movement of 1919 symbolised how enthusiastic the Korean people were for their
independence from Japan.  Influenced by the foreign-inspired ideology of socialism,
the Japanese working class too began to form their own self-interest groups in order to
resist further exploitation by Japan’s ruling elite.  In 1921 Japanese workers established
the Japan Federation of Labour (Nihon Ro¯do¯ So¯do¯mei 日本労働総同盟), aiming at
improvement in workplace conditions, and in the following year the Japan Farmers’
Union (Nihon No¯min Kumiai 日本農民組合) was founded to protect farmers.
Furthermore, in 1922, inspired by the independence movement in Korea, the
Burakumin, outcaste people, too formed the Japan Leveling Society (Nihon Suiheisha 日
本水平社) in order to abolish various kinds of institutionalised discrimination within
Japanese society.
These social movements were all considered contrary to the national polity (kokutai
国体) 11) that was based on Japan’s Imperial System.  They also reinforced a long-
standing and obsessive fear of foreign-inspired radicalism among the Japanese ruling
elite. 12) Such anxieties were not only based on political, but psychological concerns
that the diffusion of alien and radical ideologies might sully the theory of Japanese
uniqueness based on culture, race and the superiority of their national polity itself. 13)
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The initial response of the government toward the rumors about a Korean riot
following the Great Kanto Earthquake, viz., the encouragement of the formation of
vigilante corps and the introduction of martial law, were the most significant reflections
of this uneasiness.
Immediately after the circulation of the rumors about a Korean uprising, the civilian
and military leadership urged the Japanese citizens to form vigilante corps to disperse
the reported Korean rioters.  This measure was not only designed to cope with the
Korean problem, but also to control the Japanese masses, especially those from the
lower classes who had previously constituted the main force both in the Hibiya Riots
(Hibiya Yakiuchi Jiken日比谷焼討事件) of 1905 14) and the Rice Riots of 1918. 15) Since, in
the aftermath of the earthquake, the Japanese masses were viewed as having the
potential to repeat past riots, the Japanese authorities absorbed them into vigilante
corps by lending credence to the rumors about a Korean riot.  Consequently, they were
enrolled in the service of the authorities and used as chauvinistic agents against the
reported Korean rioters. 16) Meanwhile, martial law served to strengthen the
government’s control over both the “Koreans requiring surveillance” (yo¯shisatsu
Cho¯senjin 要視察朝鮮人) and Japanese progressives.  It was under martial law that the
Japanese authorities charged the noted Korean radical Pak Yõl and his wife with
plotting the assassination of the emperor; and executed a group of Japanese socialists
and the famous anarchist O¯sugi Sakae 大杉栄. 17)
The way in which these attitudes came to a head in the government during the first
critical week of September 1923 can best be illustrated by briefly looking at the
respective actions of two senior officials, one in the Metropolitan Police Department
(Keishicho¯ 警視庁) and the other in the Home Ministry.
Akaike Atsushi 赤池濃, the Inspector General of the Tokyo M.P.D., (Keishiso¯kan 警視
総監) was reportedly the man who pressed most emphatically for the imposition of
martial law. 18) In retrospect, Akaike wrote about his role in the introduction of martial
law: “Confronted with reports of increasingly mad firestorms in the capital, ...  I
requested Home Minister, Mizuno Rentaro¯水野錬太郎, through Chief of the Bureau of
Police Affairs in the Home Ministry, Goto¯ Fumio 後藤文夫, the imposition of martial
law.”  He further stated: “What most concerned me at that time was the possibility that
the shortage of food might lead to unrest and that civil discontent might erupt into
some kind of rioting in the metropolis.” 19)
Mizuno Rentaro¯, Home Minister in the Kato¯ Tomosaburo¯ Cabinet 加藤友三郎内閣
(12 June 1922–2 September 1923), whom Akaike had asked to impose martial law,
later also recalled: “On the following day [2 September], public anxieties were
increasing in the capital.  I felt that there was no predicting what might happen if we
did not take decisive measures.  I thus decided to impose martial law to pacify the
unrest among the people.” 20)
A pattern of human behaviour at a time of unrest seems to come from the
mesmerising functions of habit both in action and thought.  These senior officials had a
common experience in dealing with civil disturbances in the past.  In 1918 Mizuno, as
Home Minister, had been instrumental in the government’s handling of the Rice Riots.
He was also a strong supporter of the District Committeeman system (Ho¯meniin 方面委
員), which was established by the government to contain social unrest in urban areas. 21)
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Perhaps, because of this experience, Mizuno was appointed as the Civil Governor of
Korea (Seimu So¯kan政務総監) under Governor-General Admiral Saito¯ Makoto 朝鮮総督
海軍大将斎藤実 in September 1919, when the March First Korean Independence
Movement posed a threat to Japanese colonial rule. 22) Akaike Atsushi, then Governor
of Shizuoka Prefecture, was one of the senior officials whom Mizuno persuaded to
accompany him to Korea.  He was appointed by Mizuno as the Director of the Police
Affairs Bureau (Keimu Kyokucho¯ 警務局長) in Korea. 23) On their first day in Korea, 2
September, they were confronted by an assassination attempt against Governor-
General Saito¯ by a Korean throwing bombs at the Seoul Railway Station. 24) It would be
hard to deny that Mizuno and Akaike, faced with the vigorous protests of Korean
nationalists, had developed a kind of “Koreanophobia” marked by fear that Korean
extremists capable of attempting acts of sedition were harmful to Japan’s imperial
interests. 25) It was under Mizuno and Akaike that the Korean Independence
Movement was ruthlessly suppressed. 26)
This Koreanophobia was still well alive in the Weltanschauung of Mizuno and Akaike,
the two senior officials directly responsible for public order following the Kantô
Earthquake.  Akaike showed his Koreanophobia in his reflections about the rumors
concerning Koreans engaging in acts of sedition.  He stated, “When I received reports
that 2,000 Koreans had crossed the [Tama] River and were committing violent acts in
the city [of Tokyo], I was soon convinced that extremists in the Korean community
were fomenting unrest, ...” 27) Akaike immediately concluded that certain Koreans were
the instigators of the reported riot.  Similarly, Mizuno, while defending the imposition
of martial law as a means to prevent the Japanese people from causing any sort of
turmoil, admitted that it also was to deal with the reported Korean uprisings.  He
described his feelings as follows: 
On the following morning [of 2 September], while people were still in a state of
panic, unconfirmed rumors of a Korean riot arose ...  I soon sent for the Inspector
General of the Tokyo M.P.D. [Akaike Atsushi] and asked him about it.  He replied
that there were many rumors circulating.  After taking everything into
consideration, I came to the conclusion that the only course of action available was
to impose martial law. 28)
For those officials most concerned with the civil disturbance because of their
experiences of the Rice Riots and the Korean independence movement, the confusion
during the critical hours following the earthquake seemed nothing less than an
impending incarnation of their worst nightmares.  In view of this, their desire to impose
martial law as soon as possible to prevent a perceived repetition of the civil riots and
their initial response to rumors about a Korean uprising become highly
understandable.
Rumors and Massacre
Rumors about a Korean riot were first reported to the Tokyo M.P.D. and the
Kawasaki Police Station 川崎警察署 in Kanagawa Prefecture 神奈川県 at midday on 1
of September. 29) This first report said, “Many fires are being lit by both Japanese
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socialists and Koreans.”  Similar reports were submitted to other police stations in the
Tokyo and Kanagawa areas the same day.  Although some of these rumors on
investigation proved to be false, 30) a trickle of reports about violent acts by Korean
malcontents became a torrent by the late afternoon of the following day. 31) There may
be several reasons for this, but the main one lay in the actions taken by the civilian and
military leadership.  In the aftermath of the earthquake, the Japanese authorities took
extreme measures to lend credence to these Korean rumors and facilitate their
dissemination. 32) On 2 September, for example, Goto¯ Fumio, Chief of the Police
Affairs Bureau within the Home Ministry, sent a message by courier to the naval
transmission station at Funabashi in Chiba Prefecture. 33) This telegram was then
relayed to all prefectural governors the following morning.  It read in part:
Groups of Korean extremists are taking advantage of the disaster in Tokyo and
attempting acts of sedition.  In fact it is reported that some carry bombs, spread oil
and set fires alight.  Partial martial law has already been imposed in Tokyo.  We,
therefore, request that you increase surveillance in all areas and take rigorous
action in coping with the activities of Senjin [鮮人]. 34)
As the limited communication system in devastated areas was restored, the Home
Ministry hastened to inform adjacent local authorities of the situation in Tokyo,
requiring them to take decisive measures to maintain public order in their jurisdictions.
According to remarks made by Nagai Ryo¯taro¯永井柳太郎 in the National Diet, during
the afternoon of 2 September, the Home Ministry gave an instruction to the Saitama
Prefectural government 埼玉県庁 which in turn proceeded to relay the following advice
to the county officials under its jurisdiction:
It may be that a number of futei Senjin [不逞鮮人] who are taking advantage of the
situation and committing acts of violence in Tokyo are crossing from the
Kawaguchi side into Saitama Prefecture.  ...  Due to the weakness of the police at
the present time, I encourage you to cooperate with local chapters of the “Imperial
Reserves” (Zaigo¯ Gunjinkai 在郷軍人会), “Fire Brigades” (Sho¯bo¯dan 消防団) and
“Youth Association” (Seinenkai 青年会).  In case of an emergency, you should
immediately take suitable measures ... 35)
While messages of this nature continued to be circulated throughout the country, in
devastated areas the authorities took steps to disseminate rumors about a Korean riot.
The Tokyo M.P.D. began putting up posters and distributing leaflets, urging the still
bewildered and incredulous public to be vigilant and to cooperate with the police since
bands of Korean extremists were committing acts of sedition. 36) For instance, a big
poster appeared on 2 September on a wall in Koishikawa 小石川, Tokyo City,
alongside an official announcement informing the people of the formation of the new
Yamamoto Gombei (Gonnohyo¯e) cabinet 山本権兵衛内閣.  It stated:
BE CAREFUL OF WELL WATER!  As among the groups of Koreans and
socialists there are those who would attempt seditious acts.  To prevent these acts,
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people are urged to be ever vigilant and cooperate with the police.  Even women
and children are poisoning wells. 37)
Similarly, the Imperial Army acted as a catalyst to disseminate information
regarding the dangers posed by dissident groups within the Korean community.
Official records show that around 10:00 a.m. on 2 September on the wall outside the
Army Academy 陸軍士官学校 at Ichigaya 市ヶ谷 a notice had been posted warning of
possible attacks by groups of armed Koreans. 38) The Army also distributed leaflets
throughout much of the Tokyo area, urging the public to be vigilant since attempts had
been made by a small group of Korean malcontents.  Toida Michizo¯ 戸井田道三
recalled it in the following way:
I remember a leaflet which I saw at home in Aoyama in Tokyo city.  On the
notification it was written that Koreans poisoned wells and marked their targets ...
It was a military officer living nearby who distributed it to my house.  I had later
heard that he was an officer at the “[Army] General Staff Office” (Sambo¯ Honbu 参
謀本部). 39)
On the other hand, both the police and the Imperial Army issued instructions to the
men under their respective commands to use weapons against any Koreans reported to
be committing acts of insurgency.  On 2 September the Tokyo M.P.D. sent an order to
the police chiefs of Shibuya, Setagaya and Shinagawa Police Stations, instructing them
to be aware of any Koreans committing acts of sedition: “You should mobilise your
officers on the roads and annihilate those Korean traitors.” 40) Meanwhile, Army
Lieutenant General Moriyama Saneyoshi 森山守成, the Commander of the Imperial
Guard Division, issued the following instructions to troops under his command: “At
this time of great panic, you must prevent the people from taking advantage of the
disaster and disturbing public order.  If they refuse to obey after receiving a warning,
you may use your weapons.” 41) These instructions proved to be the trigger, which set
off a relentless hunt for Koreans.  As Ecchu¯ya Riichi 越中谷利一, a member of the 13th
regiment of the Narashino Cavalry 習志野騎兵団, recalled:
It was approximately 2:00 p.m. [2 September] when we arrived in Kameido, and
the victims of the earthquake were like an overflowing flood.  As the first action of
the regiment, we searched trains.  Officers drew swords and inspected both inside
and outside every train.  Every train was overcrowded ..., and Koreans who were
among the passengers were dragged off.  They were immediately thrown under
our swords and bayonets.  From the midst of the Japanese victims came a
tempestuous chorus of “Banzai!, Traitors [Kokuzoku 国賊]!, Kill all Koreans!”
Following this bloodshed, our regiment embarked upon a hunt for Koreans from
the evening until nightfall. 42)
These official notifications and actions were effective enough to provoke anti-Korean
riots among the Japanese population.  Accepting the rumors about a Korean riot
sanctioned by the Japanese authorities, they began to follow in the footsteps of the
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military officers.  As Kubono Shigeji 久保野茂次, an army soldier at that time,
described it: “No sooner had we arrived than members of local reservists began to kill
Koreans, and abandoned their bodies to the river.  A band of twenty Koreans, to my
knowledge, were massacred [by them].” 43)
As the violence of the vigilante corps posed a threat to social order and public safety,
the Japanese government found it necessary to contain their anti-Korean activities. 44)
On 3 September the civilian and military leadership prohibited the possession of any
weapons by members of the vigilante corps, while denying many of the previously
reported incidents involving acts of sedition committed by Koreans as no more than
rumors. 45) The authorities also agreed that, although the incidents involving members
of vigilante corps should not be overlooked in legal terms, due to many extenuating
circumstances the scope of arrests and prosecutions would be only limited to extreme
cases. 46) Moreover, those arrests should be delayed in light of the present social 
unrest. 47)
Although estimates vary, government reports indicated that by the end of November
the official investigation had led to the arrest of between 600 and 700 members of
vigilante corps throughout the Kanto region. 48) Not all the accused were indicted.
According to statistics compiled by Matsuo Takayoshi, only 125 were prosecuted in the
trials; two were acquitted, ninety-one received suspended sentences, and thirty-two
actually served their sentences. 49) The maximum penalty imposed on them was a four-
year sentence; only two received this penalty.  Similar investigations concerning the
trial cases of vigilante corps members have been conducted by Yamada Sho¯ji 山田昭次.
Of the eighty-five accused of committing murder of Koreans in Saitama Prefecture,
seventy-four received suspended sentences, and in only eleven cases (12.9 per cent)
were the formal sentences actually carried out. 50) Yamada has also claimed that of the
eighty-two accused of attacking the Honjo¯ 本庄 and other police stations and killing
Koreans who were housed in these stations, roughly half (thirty-nine, 47.6 per cent)
were exempt from prison sentence; thirty-six received suspended sentences; and three
were found not guilty. 51) A police officer of the Funabashi Police Station 船橋警察署,
Chiba Prefecture 千葉県 revealed the way in which the authorities conducted an
investigation into members of the vigilante corps for the murder of Koreans:
From around 20 September [1923], the authorities began to prosecute members of
the vigilante corps and others committing murder.  ...  We travelled on business to
Urayasu 浦安 and Gyo¯toku 行徳, and took a number of suspects [to the Funabashi
Police Station.]  A judge, a prosecutor and some clerks, all of whom came from
Chiba City, waited at Restaurant Inageya in Funabashi City and summoned the
suspects one by one.  The prosecutor began an investigation on one of the suspects
by saying, “I will give you a suspended sentence.”  The suspect thus freely
confessed his acts.  Then the judge declared: “You killed two [Koreans], did you
not?  So, I will give you a two-year prison sentence and a three-year suspended
sentence, understood?”  The judge also asked the suspect, “are you entering an
appeal?”  The suspect replied, “no, I will not, sir.”  “OK, you can go home.”  ...
We called these investigations “one-day trials” (ichinichi saiban一日裁判). 52)
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The number of Koreans massacred by members of the Imperial Army, the police
and members of the vigilante corps throughout the Kanto¯ area following the Great
Kanto¯ Earthquake remains the subject of considerable controversy.  According to a
survey carried out by correspondents of a Korean newspaper, it was estimated that in
the Kanto¯ area alone a total of 6,661 Koreans were slain following the earthquake; 53)
whereas a Home Ministry report limited the figure of those Koreans killed by Japanese
to just 303. 54) This lower estimate by the Police Affairs Bureau, however, was later
challenged by Fuse Tatsuji 布施辰治, a lawyer belonging to the Civil Liberties Legal
Association ( Jiyu¯ Ho¯so¯dan 自由法曹団) who conducted his own investigations into the
number of Koreans killed.  In his findings he stated that there had been as many as
20,000 Korean residents in the Kanto¯ area at the time of the earthquake and, according
to the survey, there were only 12,000–13,000 whose whereabouts were able to be
confirmed after the Korean hunt.  Fuse therefore argued that the government’s estimate
of 300 was far too low, and concluded that the whereabouts of at least 6,000 to 7,000
Koreans could not be traced. 55)
On 22 October, 1923, the Japanese government announced to the press that the
police were filing charges against a total of twenty-three Koreans.  According to an
article in the Jiji Shimpo¯ 時事新報, of the twenty-three Koreans, the surnames of sixteen
were unknown, and thus they were never caught. 56) The identities of the remaining
suspects were also doubtful: one committed suicide by taking poison; two ran away
after firing shots at the members of vigilante groups who had caught them; and four
were never apprehended. 57) Similarly, the result of the investigation by the Justice
Ministry concerning the crimes committed by Koreans was open to question.  A Justice
Ministry report stated that forty-nine crimes had been committed by Koreans in the
Tokyo and Yokohama 横浜 areas during the first two weeks of September 1923;
namely, two murders, three acts of arson, four burglaries, and forty miscellaneous
offences. 58) Of the more than 250 suspected Koreans rounded up by the authorities, the
police were only able to identify and charge twenty-five; moreover, the police were
unable to identify nine of the Japanese victims. 59)
What or Who was Responsible for Anti-Korean Rumors
While government reports claimed that there had been reckless behaviour on the
part of a small minority of Korean malcontents following the earthquake, they
significantly remained silent on the important question: what or who was directly
responsible for starting rumors about a Korean riot, and causing the subsequent mass
murder of Koreans.  Yamaguchi Seiken 山口正憲, a labour union activist in the
Yokohama area, was the only man accused of starting rumors about a Korean riot, 60)
but he was arrested as the leader of Korean malcontents on 10 September. 61) On the
other hand, the evidence strongly suggests that the responsibility for the dissemination
of anti-Korean rumors lay with the actions taken by the Japanese authorities during the
first days following the earthquake.  This, coupled with the respective careers of
Mizuno and Akaike and the implausibility of official reports concerning the crimes
committed by Koreans, later led some commentators, such as Kang Tõk-sang 姜徳相,
and Saito¯ Hideo 斎藤秀夫, to become suspicious about the involvement of the
government.  These commentators have argued that the Japanese government
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intentionally manufactured anti-Korean rumors in an attempt to impose martial law
and thus maintain public safety. 62) On the other hand, Michael Weiner is of the
opposite view.  In The Origins of The Korean Community in Japan 1910–1923, Weiner
firmly rejects the theory of a government plot because:
Given the immediacy of the crisis which confronted men like Mizuno and the
disruption of nearly all means of communication, this conspiracy theory must be
regarded as merely speculative.  Not only is it likely that martial law would have
been imposed even in the absence of anti-Korean rumors, but, given the overall
situation, the Government can hardly be criticised for expecting the presence of
the army to have a calming effect. 63)
As Weiner points out, confronted with the terrible catastrophe, officials like Mizuno
and Akaike who were responsible for internal security might have “lost their cool.”
Given the food shortage and social unrest, it is likely that even if there were no rumors
about a Korean riot, martial law would have been imposed soon after the earthquake,
for one can infer that its imposition would be necessary to maintain social order and
public safety.
However, the motion to introduce martial law met with a strong opposition within
the government and was once withdrawn in the afternoon of 1 September.
Amendments were made to the bill as a result of Akaike’s strong arguments and martial
law was imposed the next day. 64) Goto¯ Shimpei 後藤新平, who succeeded Mizuno as
Home Minister in the Yamamoto Gombei Cabinet formed on 2 September, later
complained of the measures carried out by the previous Kato¯ Tomosaburo¯ Cabinet.
Goto¯ argued that since the earthquake constituted neither an external war nor an
internal riot, the imposition of martial law had been without precedent. 65) His
statement was indicative of the background against which the imposition of martial law
was forcibly and arbitrarily determined.
Martial law was put into effect on the evening of 2 September.  This suggests that the
government’s decisions to introduce martial law were made by the late evening of the
day before or at least the early morning of that day.  It was during this period that the
police and the Imperial Army actively began to disseminate rumors about Koreans
poisoning wells, throwing bombs and raping Japanese women.  As the proposal of
martial law had been turned down once, Akaike might have needed other, more
powerful, reasons to convince his colleagues within the government to agree to its
introduction: he used a series of rumors about Korean disturbances to get it introduced.
Moreover, given the significant role that the police played in facilitating the spread of
the rumors during the period in question, it can also be inferred that Akaike ordered
his junior officers to foster their dissemination in order to put pressure on other
government officials that the imposition of martial law was the only course available to
deal with impending Korean riots.
Haunted by the experiences of the past, both Mizuno and Akaike duly overreacted.
While the rumors about a Korean riot were investigated and found to be utterly
groundless, these senior officials intentionally fostered the anti-Korean rumors in order
to impose martial law as a means of strengthening their control over the masses.
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Following the promulgation of martial law, they also issued, on 7 September, Imperial
Ordinance No. 403, known as the Peace Preservation Act (Chian iji rei 治安維持令). 66)
Both of these ordinances were quite effective in not only exercising control over the
publication of newspaper and magazine articles which were considered to be opposed
to the government’s handling of the Korean affair, 67) but in stifling any sort of social
movements among the Koreans and Japanese.  During the Korean witch-hunt, the
Japanese government set up temporary “reception centers” in many parts of Japan to
safeguard the lives of Korean residents.  According to a Home Ministry report, 23,715
Koreans were housed in these centers after the earthquake. 68) It appears, however, that
this “protective custody” was confused with “preventive detention.”  Among the first to
be interned were those “requiring surveillance” like Pak Yõl 朴烈, 69) and in Chiba
Prefecture, the police themselves committed mass murder of Koreans in their
protective custody. 70) The police also seized nine members of the Nankatsu Labour
Association 南葛労働会 in Tokyo and took them to the Kameido Police Station 亀戸警
察署 where they were murdered, either by members of the police or by soldiers
assigned to maintain public order in the area. 71)
Moreover, in order to examine the government plot theory, attention should be
given again to the first rumor reported to the Tokyo M.P.D. and the Kawasaki Police
Station 川崎警察署, which said, “Many fires are being lit by both Japanese socialists and
Koreans.”  It needs to be noted that there were only two reports concerning socialists
committing subversive acts, 72) and for the most parts, socialists tended to join vigilante
corps, engaged in social activities in their neighbourhoods. 73) Given these factors, it can
hardly be possible that the first rumor about acts of sedition by socialists and Koreans
spontaneously appeared among the Japanese public. 74)
As has been demonstrated in this article, it was Japanese officials most concerned
with the political activities of socialists and Koreans during the years prior to the
earthquake who took the lead in circulating rumors about Koreans.  Such government
uneasiness is best illustrated by a discussion held at the Police Department of the
Emergency Earthquake Relief Bureau (Rinji Shinsai Kyu¯go Jimukyoku Keibibu 臨時震災救
護事務局警備部) on 5 September.  Present at this meeting were representatives of the
Imperial Army, Navy, Home Ministry, the Tokyo M.P.D. and the Martial Law
Command (Kaigenrei Shireibu 戒厳令司令部). 75) They discussed the best course for
limiting both international and domestic criticism of the government’s handling of the
Korean issue during the preceding week, and ways of creating a ‘plot’ by both Koreans
and Japanese socialists.  In a secret memorandum entitled “Policy Concerning the
Korean Problem” (Cho¯sen mondai ni kansuru kyo¯tei朝鮮問題に関する協定), they agreed: 
(a) To investigate and, if possible, confirm incidents in which Koreans attempted
to commit acts of sedition;
(b) To take suitable measures to prevent Koreans from spreading rumors
[unfavourable to Japan] in either Korea or Manchuria;
(c) To create and disseminate an impression, particularly overseas, that both
Koreans and Japanese “Reds” had actually engaged in disturbing acts of
violence. 76)
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Here we quote at length from Serizawa Mitsuyoshi’s 芹沢光治良 book, Lost Persons
(Ushinawareta Hito 失われた人).  Although this is a novel, the story was based on the
experiences of Serizawa himself at the time of the earthquake, and the following
observations within the work are indicative of the forces at work in the minds of
Japanese officials during the first critical week of September 1923.  It reads, in part:
..., the government’s proposal for the Peace Preservation Law was rejected in the
Diet last year [1922], was it not?  But, the formation of the Japan Communist Party
was disclosed in June this year, and this led to the mass arrest of its members.  The
police also rounded up communist members of a revolutionary labour union in
Nagoya, did they not?  I assume that the development of communism and
syndicalism added fuel to official anxieties.  Therefore, ... the Japanese government
imposed martial law on 2 September, and five days later issued the Peace
Preservation Act.  This act was the de facto Peace Preservation Law.  It may be
that the authorities seized this opportunity to suppress and persecute socialists.
It also added that: 
Banzai Jiken [万歳事件 the March First Korean Independence Movement] occurred
just three or four years ago, did it not?  These demonstrations were so dreadful
that the Japanese authorities were barely able to suppress them.  Since then, I
suppose, they came to embrace a suspicion and anxiety that Koreans might repeat
their resistance to Japanese domination.  Therefore, they lost their cool in a state of
confusion following the earthquake, spreading [anti-Korean] rumors, and urging
the formation of vigilante corps ... 77)
Some may argue that rumors about Korean uprisings emanated spontaneously from
the Japanese public because they too shared anxieties about the Korean community in
Japan.  Others may insist that the responsibility lay with those Japanese who committed
crimes in devastated areas and then spread rumors that these crimes were committed
by Koreans. 78) Both of these suggestions may be true.  But doubt is cast upon the
ability of the general public to manipulate the latent Koreanophobia, which affected
many Japanese at the time.  While there is no decisive evidence that the Japanese
government manufactured rumors about a Korean riot in order to impose martial law,
it was the authorities most concerned with the Korean problem, who knew about
public prejudice against and fear of the Korean minority, who took the lead.  The
following extract from Hasegawa Nyozekan 長谷川如是閑, a highly acclaimed liberal
journalist at the time, indicated this:
... there is no doubt that the recent rumors about a Korean riot have their origins
in the minds of those people most concerned with the Korean problem from the
viewpoint of ‘occupation’ (shokugyo¯ 職業), ‘interests’ (shumi 趣味) or ‘ideology’ (shiso¯
思想).  It is wrong to suggest that rumors emerged from an ‘ignorant public’ (gumin
愚民).  In ‘civilised countries’ (bummeikoku 文明国), for the most part, rumors
emanate from ‘well informed men’ ( jijo¯tsu¯ 事情通).  As ancient rumors developed
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mainly from magicians who belonged to the intellectual class at the time, an
ignorant public can never manipulate a psychology which lies dormant in the
minds of the majority population. 79)
O¯kubo’s words, which were quoted at the beginning of this paper, are indicative of
his admission that the Japanese government manufactured and circulated rumors about
a Korean riot following the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923.  Prejudice and fear,
which affected many Japanese officials at that time, encouraged the use of inhumane
measures against powerless Koreans.  In the Kanto Earthquake, it was neither Japanese
extremists nor other minority groups, but the Korean community that was targeted as
the great menace to social harmony and was assigned the role of scapegoat by the
authorities through which the unease and anger of the indigenous population were to
be directed in the interests of the government of Japan.
The politically vulnerable Koreans, in the meanwhile, would not understand the
Koreanophobia so prevalent in the society into which they had immigrated.  So it was
possible for this minuscule minority to be attacked without a full and thorough
appreciation of what had happened to them.  They could only wonder how their fellow
men could treat them in this way when their only crime was being Korean.  The
Koreans could neither rely upon legislative measures, nor provoke international
debate, but there could be no doubt that the Great Kanto Earthquake sowed the seeds
of Korean hatred for government’s officials, particularly Mizuno and Akaike.  At no
time was their resentment toward both Mizuno and Akaike more explicitly disclosed
than on 1 September 1924, when the following leaflet was distributed by the Corps of
Koreans in Japan (Zai-Nichi Senjindan在日鮮人団):
[Officials of the Home Ministry] made use of Koreans [to prevent an internal riot]
because they knew that negative images of Koreans have been ingrained in the
minds of Japanese citizens through the propaganda of bourgeoisie officials,
intellectuals and journalists.  The Home Ministry also realized that even if Koreans
were murdered, the Koreans could neither rely upon legislative measures, nor
provoke international debate.  Akaike Atsushi [Inspector General of the Tokyo
M.P.D.] and Mizuno Rentarô [Home Minister] were well aware of this, for they
have suppressed a great number of our comrades by any means since the March
First Korean Independence Movement.  ...  [Therefore], the final targets of our
struggle are Mizuno Rentarô and Akaike Atsushi.  It was they who were directly
responsible for causing and facilitating the mass murder of Koreans [following the
earthquake].
Corps of Koreans in Japan
(Zai-Nichi Senjindan 在日鮮人団), 1924. 80)
Conclusion
The principal explanation for the anti-Korean rumors that came to a head in the
massacre of 1923 is that these rumors took shape in official resentment toward the
Korean community in Japan.  Japanese high-ranking officials, particularly Mizuno and
Akaike, defined the Koreans as ungrateful and anti-Japanese through their past
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experiences.  They were aware of the Korean hatred for the Japanese government,
which encouraged the Koreans, on the one hand to assimilate completely, while
despising them as an inferior race.  Thus, when faced with the state of the confusion
following the earthquake, the Japanese elite were already predisposed to target the
Korean minority as the great menace to social harmony, which called for still more
forceful demonstration of Japanese strength and superiority.  These perceptions
provoked a distorted view of Koreans that saw them as inferior against whom any
action was permissible.  In this view, the theory of a government plot —— that the
Japanese ruling class manufactured and spread rumors about Korean rioting in order to
maintain social order and public safety —— becomes highly understandable.
In sum, official resentment toward Korean people illuminates much about the
massacre of the Koreans following the Great Kanto Earthquake, for it offers unique
insights into the question of how anti-Korean rumors crossed official minds.  A study of
their anti-Korean sentiments enables us to provide a more convincing explanation
about how they came to embrace anti-Korean rumors in the interests of the
government.  In fact, the issue of the Korean rumors cannot be fully explained without
a thorough appreciation of anti-Korean racism engrained in the thinking of many
Japanese elites.
End Notes
1) Shin Hong-shick, “Shu¯yo¯jo kara tsuredasarete” [“収容所から連れ出されて Placed in Harms Way”] in
Chiba ken ni okeru Kanto¯ Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin Giseisha Tsuito¯ Cho¯sa Jikko¯ Iinkai [千葉県における
関東大震災と朝鮮人犠牲者追悼・調査実行委員会 A Memorial Survey Executive Committee for
Korean Victims in Chiba Prefecture at the time of the Great Kanto Earthquake], ed., Iwarenaku
Korosareta Hitobito [いわれなく殺された人びと The Unjustifiable Slaughter of Persons] (Tokyo: Aoki
Shoten, 1983), 236 (hereafter referred to as Iwarenaku Korosareta Hitobito).
2) Kanto is an area of Japan including Tokyo and the adjacent prefectures.  Today, they are Kanagawa,
Chiba, Saitama, Tochigi, Gumma, Ibaragi Prefectures and Tokyo.
3) Keishicho¯ Hensan Iinkai [警視庁編纂委員会 The Metropolitan Police Department Compilation
Committee], ed., Keishicho¯ Shi, dai 2 kan: Taisho¯ hen [警視庁史第二巻：大正編 The History of the
Metropolitan Police Department, vol. 2: A Chapter of Taisho¯ Period] (Tokyo: Keishicho¯ Hensai Iinkai,
n. d.), 408.  Hugh Borton presents different figures, stating that: “An estimated 157,000 persons had
lost their lives.”  See Hugh Borton, Japan’s Modern Century From Perry to 1970 (New York: The Ronald
Press Company, 1970), 348.
4) Martial law was extended to include Kanagawa Prefecture on 3 September, and Chiba and Saitama
Prefectures on the following day.
5) “Saitamaken Tsu¯tatsubun” [“埼玉県通達文 A Notification of Saitama Prefecture”] in Fukuoka Nichinichi
newspaper 福岡日日新聞, 19 October 1923.  Quoted in Kang Tõk-sang 姜徳相 and Kuˇm Pyoˇng-dong
琴秉洞, Gendaishi Shiryo¯  6: Kanto¯ Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin [現代史資料第六巻：関東大震災と朝鮮人
Source Materials on Contemporary History, vol. 6: Great Kanto¯ Earthquake and Koreans] (Tokyo:
Misuzu Shobo¯, 1967), 145 (hereafter referred to as Kanto¯ Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin).
6) According to a Home Ministry report, approximately 3,700 vigilante corps were organised in the
Kanto¯ area in the first week of September, with the figure in Tokyo alone estimated at 1,593.  Home
Ministry [内務省 Japan’s Home Ministry], “Jikeidan no Torishimari” [“自警団の取締り Regulation of
Vigilante Corps”].  Quoted in Kuˇm Pyoˇng-dong 琴秉洞, ed., Kanto¯ Daishinsai Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsu
Mondai Kankei Shiryo¯ II: Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsu Kanren Kancho¯ Shiryo¯ [関東大震災朝鮮人虐殺問題関係資
料 II：朝鮮人虐殺関連官庁資料 Historical Materials Concerning the Massacre of the Koreans after
the Great Kanto Earthquake, vol. 2: Official Materials Concerning the Massacre of Koreans] (Tokyo:
Ryokuin Shobo¯, 1991), 11 (hereafter referred to as Kancho¯ Shiryo¯).  Also see Imai Seiichi 今井精一 and
122
Saito¯ Hideo 斎藤秀夫, “Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsu no Kyu¯mei” [“大震災と朝鮮人虐殺の究
明 The Examination of the Korean Massacre and the Great Kanto Earthquake”] in Kanto¯ Daishinsai
Gojusshu¯nen Cho¯senjin Giseisha Tsuito¯ Gyo¯ji Jikko¯ Iinkai [関東大震災 50 周年朝鮮人犠牲者追悼行事
実行委員会 A Memorial Event Executive Committee for Korean Victims on the Fiftieth Anniversary
of the Great Kanto Earthquake], ed., Rekishi no Shinjitsu: Kanto¯ Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsu [歴史
の真実：関東大震災と朝鮮人虐殺 Fact of History: The Great Kanto Earthquake and the Korean
Massacre] (Tokyo: Gendaishi Shuppankai, 1975), 76 (hereafter referred to as Rekishi no Shinjitsu).
7) Hayakawa Hiroyuki 早川洋行, Ryu¯gen no Shakaigaku —— Keishiki Shakaigaku karano Sekkin [流言の社会
学：形式社会学からの接近 Sociology of Rumor —— Approach from Formal Sociology], (Tokyo:
Seikyu¯sha, 2002), 48.
8) Of the commentators, who have dedicated to the task of examining the root-cause of anti-Korean
rumors after the Great Kanto Earthquake, the majority support the theory of a government plot.  For
example, see Kang Tõk-sang 姜徳相, Kanto¯  Daishinsai [関東大震災 The Great Kanto Earthquake]
(Tokyo: Chu¯o¯ Ko¯ronsha, 1975), Yamada Sho¯ji 山田昭次, Kanto¯ Daishinsaiji no Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsu ——
Sono Kokkan Sekinin to Minshu¯ Sekinin [関東大震災時の朝鮮人虐殺―その国家責任と民衆責任 The
Massacre of Koreans after the Great Kanto Earthquake —— The Responsibility of the State and Citizens
for the Incident] (Tokyo: So¯shisha, 2003), Matsuo Sho¯ichi 松尾章一, Kanto¯ Daishinsai to Kaigenrei [関東
大震災と戒厳令 The Great Kanto Earthquake and Martial Law] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Ko¯bunkan, 2003).
9) Only Kang Tõk-sang dedicated to the task of examining what or who was directly responsible for
starting reports of violent acts by Koreans.  In his Kanto¯ Daishinsai, published in 1975, Kang spent
many pages in treating this issue and convincingly argued that the civilian and military leadership
intentionally manufactured anti-Korean rumors in order to maintain social order.  See Kang Tõk-sang,
Kanto¯ Daishinsai [関東大震災 The Great Kanto Earthquake] (Tokyo: Chu¯o¯ Ko¯ronsha, 1975).
10) The Rice Riots were nationwide popular uprisings against a sudden rise in the price of rice.  These
movements affected thirty prefectures in which tens of thousands of people were arrested and over
7,000 charged; some even received the death penalty.  These riots caused the corruption of the
Terauchi Masatake Cabinet 寺内正毅内閣 (9 Oct. 1916–29 Sept. 1918).
11) The fundamental concept behind the ‘national polity’ was the existence of the emperor as the highest
power in the state, and the statement of a morality of filial piety and loyalty governing the relationship
between the emperor and his people which made the nation an organic whole. See CDMJH, 98–9.
12) Michael Weiner, Race and Migration in Imperial Japan (London: Routledge, 1994), 64.
13) Ibid.
14) See Kokushi Daijiten Hensan Iinkai [国史大辞典編纂委員会 National History Compilation
Committee], ed., Kokushi Daijiten dai 11 kan [国史大辞典第十一巻 Dictionary of National History, 
vol. 11] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Ko¯bunkan, 1989), 978 (hereafter referred to as KDJ ).
15) Iwamura Toshio 岩村登志男, Zainichi Cho¯senjin to Nihon ro¯do¯sha kaikyu¯ [在日朝鮮人と日本労働者階級
Koreans in Japan and the Japanese working class] (Tokyo: Azekura Shobo¯, 1972), 88–90.
16) Iwamura, Zainichi Cho¯senjin to Nihon ro¯do¯sha kaikyu¯, 88–90.
17) Hsü Shih-k’ai 許世楷, “Boku Retsu Jiken —— Shiitageraretamono no Hangyaku” [“朴烈事件―虐げられ
たものの反逆 Incident of Pak Yõl —— Rebellion of the Oppressed”] in Wagatsuma Sakae 我妻栄, ed.,
Nihon Seiji Saiban Shiroku 3: Taisho¯  hen [日本政治裁判史録三：大正編 Historical Documents
Concerning Political Trial in Japan, vol. 3: Taisho¯ Version] (Tokyo: Daiichi Shuppan, 1977), 
379–411.  Wagatsuma Sakae, “Amakasu Jiken —— Kempei ni Gyakusatsu sareta Museifushugisha,
O¯sugi Sakae” [“Incident of Amakasu —— The Anarchist O¯sugi Sakae killed by a Gendarme”] in ibid.,
412–38.
18) O¯saka Asahi newspaper 大阪朝日新聞, 5 October 1923, quoted in Kang, Kanto¯ Daishinsai, 20.
19) Akaike Atsushi 赤池濃, “Daishinsai to¯ji ni okeru Shokan” [“大震災当時に於ける所感My Thoughts on
the Time of the Great Kanto Earthquake”], in Jikei [自警], vol. 51 (November 1923).  Quoted in Kanto¯
Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin, 5–6.
20) Mizuno Rentaro¯水野錬太郎, Gakan Dankuzu我観談屑.  Quoted in Kanto¯ Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin, 12.
21) Weiner, The Origins of the Korean Community in Japan, 186.
22) Ku Dae-yeol, Korea under Colonialism: The March First Movement and Anglo-Japanese Relations (Seoul:
Seoul Computer Press, 1985), 122.
123
23) Frank Prentiss Baldwin Jr., The March First Movement Korean Challenge and Japanese Response, Ph. D.
dissertation Columbia University, 1969.  Quoted in Weiner, The Origins of the Korean Community in
Japan 1910–1923, 186.
24) Ku, Korea under Colonialism, 200.
25) Eguchi Kiyoshi 江口渙, “Daishinsai to Facism X no Shippai” [“大震災とファシズム X の失敗 The
Great Earthquake and the Failure of Facism X”] in Sekai [世界], the September 1930 issue.  Quoted in
Kuˇm Pyoˇng-dong 琴秉洞, ed., Kanto¯ Daishinsai Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsu Mondai Kankei Shiryo¯ III: Cho¯senjin
Gyakusatsu ni Kansuru Chishikijin no Hanno¯ 2 [関東大震災朝鮮人虐殺問題関係資料 III：朝鮮人虐殺に
関する知識人の反応 2 Historical Materials Concerning the Massacre of the Koreans after the Great
Kanto Earthquake, vol. 3: Intellectual Response to the Massacre of the Koreans 2] (Tokyo: Ryokuin
Shobo¯, 1996), 86–93 (hereafter referred to as Chishikijin no Hanno¯, vol. 2). 
26) Baldwin, The March First Movement Korean Challenge and Japanese Response, 186–213.  Quoted in Weiner,
The Origins of the Korean Community in Japan 1910–1923, 187.
27) Akaike, “Daishinsai to¯ji ni okeru Shokan,” quoted in Kanto¯ Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin, 9–11.
28) Mizuno Rentaro¯, “Teito Fukko¯ Hiroku” [“帝都復興秘録 Confidential Reports on the Reconstruction
of the Capital”] in Tokyo Shiseicho¯sakai 東京市政調査会, ed., Mizuno Rentaro¯ Danwa [水野錬太郎談話
Mizuno Rentaro¯ Conversation].  Quoted in Kanto¯ Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin, 11.
29) Imai and Saito¯, ‘Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsu no Kyu¯mei,’ in Rekishi no Shinjitsu, 36–8.
30) Shôriki Matsutaro¯ 正力松太郎, “Kome So¯do¯ to Daishinsai no Omoide” [“米騒動と大震災の思い出
Memories of the Rice Riots and the Great Kanto Earthquake”] in Akusenkuto¯ [悪戦苦闘 Desperate
fights, and Bitter Struggles].  Quoted in Matsuo and Kito¯, ‘Sho¯gen to Shiryo¯,’ 237–8.  Sho¯riki Matsutaro¯
was Secretary General in the Tokyo M.P.D. at the time of the Great Kanto Earthquake.  
31) Imai and Saito¯, “Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsu no Kyu¯mei,” in Rekishi no Shinjitsu, 36–9.
32) Due to both the disruption of nearly all means of communication in Tokyo, and the government
control over the publication of newspapers and magazine articles dealing with the Korean affairs,
Japan’s leading newspapers played only a minor role in disseminating rumors about a Korean riot.
Only To¯kyo¯ Nichinichi newspaper 東京日日新聞 issued an article dealing with Korean riots in Tokyo
on 3 September 1923.  Meanwhile, as will be examined later in this article, local newspapers acted as a
catalyst to spread rumors about Korean uprisings over the whole country.  See Matsuo Takayoshi 松尾
尊兌, “Kanto¯ Daishinsai kano Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsu Jiken, jo¯” [“関東大震災下の朝鮮人虐殺事件(上)
The Massacre of the Koreans after the Great Kanto Earthquake, the First Volume”] in Shiso¯ [思想] 471
(September 1963), 56.
33) This telegram was carried by a courier from the Home Ministry in Tokyo to Funabashi because all
means of communication in Tokyo at that time were completely destroyed by the earthquake and
subsequent fires.  According to the testimony of Captain O¯mori Ryo¯zo¯大森良三 who was in charge of
the Funabashi Station during that time, he received the message about the Koreans in the afternoon of
2 September and relayed it to the Kure Naval Station the following morning.  O¯mori Ryo¯zo¯大森良三,
“Sôshinjo nite toritaru Shochi narabini Jo¯kyo¯” [“送信所にて採りたる処置竝に状況 Disposition and
Situation taken in the Funabashi Naval Transmission Station”] in Kanto¯  Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin, 
23–30.
34) Quoted in Kantô Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin, 18.  Similar telegrams were also sent to the Government-
Generals of both Korea and Taiwan on the same day.  See, ibid., 18–9.
35) This notification was reported in the 19 October 1923 edition of the Fukuoka Nichinichi newspaper.
Quoted in Kanto¯ Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin, p. 145.  Also see Kanto¯ Daishinsai Gojusshu¯nen Cho¯senjin
Giseisha Cho¯sa Tsuito¯ Jigyo¯ Jikko¯ Iinkai [関東大震災五十周年朝鮮人犠牲者調査追悼事業実行委員会
The Standing Committee for Investigative and Memorial Enterprises, Fifty-Year Memorial for Korean
Victims of the Great Kanto Earthquake], Kakusareteita Rekishi: Kanto¯ Daishinsai to Saitama no Cho¯senjin
Gyakusatsu Jiken [かくされていた歴史：関東大震災と埼玉の朝鮮人虐殺事件 The Hidden History:
The Great Kanto Earthquake and the Massacre of Koreans in Saitama] (O¯miya: Niccho¯ Kyo¯kai
Saitama Rengo¯kai, 1974), 18–24 (hereafter referred to as Kakusareteita Rekishi ).
36) Kokumin newspaper 国民新聞, 14 October 1923.  This is taken from an article of Uesugi Shingo 上杉
慎吾, “Keisatsu Kanken ni Kaito¯ o Motomu” [“警察官憲に回答を求む Requesting a Definite Response
from Police Officials”].  Quoted in Kanto¯ Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin, 148.
124
37) Eguchi Kiyoshi, “Kanto¯ Daishinsai Kaiso¯ki” [“関東大震災回想記 Memories of the Great Kanto
Earthquake”] in Gunzo¯ [群像] (September 1954).  Quoted in Chishikijin no Hanno¯, vol. 2, 437.
38) Kanto¯ Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin, 52–3.
39) Toida Michizô 戸井田道三, Nobinobi Jinseiron Series (5): Ikirukoto ni Maru Batsu ha nai [のびのび人生シ
リーズ(5)：生きることに○×はない Collected Eassays for Way of Life, vol. 5: There is Neither Maru
Nor Batsu in Life].  Quoted in Kim Tal-su 金達寿, Nobinobi Jinseiron Series (16): Watashi no Sho¯nen Jidai,
Sabetsu no naka ni Ikiru [のびのび人生シリーズ(16)：私の少年時代差別の中に生きる Collected
Eassys for Way of Life, vol. 16: My Childhood, A Life in Discrimination] (Tokyo: Pupurasha, 1982), 
112.  During the Pacific War, Toida was made aware that the man who had distributed the leaflet was
Lieutenant General Mutaguchi Renya 牟田口廉也, who was a commander of the Imperial Army to
lead the fight to take Singapore during the war.
40) Keishicho¯ [The Tokyo M.P.D.], ed., Taisho¯  Daishin Kasaishi [大正大震火災史 History of Taisho
Earthquake and the Subsequent Fires] (Tokyo: Keishicho¯, 1925), 30–1.  Quoted in Imai and Saito¯,
“Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsu no Kyu¯mei,” in Rekishi no Shinjitsu, 35.
41) Kanto¯ Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin, 100.
42) Ecchu¯ya Riichi 越中谷利一, “Kanto¯ Daishinsai no Omoide” [“関東大震災の思い出 Memories of the
Great Kanto¯ Earthquake”] in Nihon to Cho¯sen [日本と朝鮮 Japan and Korea], 1 September 1961.
Quoted in Iwamura, Zai-Nichi Cho¯senjin to Nihon Ro¯do¯sha Kaikyu¯, 85.  Also see Eba Osamu 江馬修,
“Chi no 9 gatsu” [“血の九月 Blood September”].  Quoted in Chishikijin no Hanno¯, vol. 2, 421–4.
43) Kubono Shigeji 久保野茂次, “Taisho¯ 12 nen ji 7 gatsu 5 ka itaru 12 gatsu 31 nichi Nikki” [“大正十二年
自七月五日至十二月三十一日日記 Diary from 5 July to 31 December 1923”].  Quoted in Chishikijin
no Hanno¯, vol. 2, 415.  Shinohara Kyo¯ko 篠原京子, “Cho¯senjin wo Yakikoroshita Hitotachi” [“朝鮮人
を焼き殺した人たち People who burned Koreans to Death”] in Rekishi no Shinjitsu, 182–4.
44) Matsuo, “Kanto¯ Daishinsai kano Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsu Jiken, jo¯,” 53.
45) Ibid., 55–7.
46) Kanto¯ Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin, 82.
47) Ibid.  The arrests of the vigilante corps began in Tokyo on 17 September, in Gumma and Saitama on
19 September, and in Yokohama and Chiba on 20 September.  See Kang, Kanto¯ Daishinsai, 173.
Meanwhile, Imai and Saito¯ argued that the arrests of the vigilante corps in Yokohama began on 10
September.  Imai and Saito¯, “Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsu no Kyu¯mei,” in Rekishi no Shinjitsu,
81.
48) Matsuo, “Kanto¯ Daishinsai ka no Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsu Jiken, jo¯,” 59–60.
49) Ibid., p. 60.
50) Yamada Sho¯ji 山田昭次, “Kanto¯ Daishinsai ji no Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsu Sekinin no Yukue” [“関東大震
災時の朝鮮人虐殺責任のゆくえ The Responsibility for the murder of Koreans following the Great
Kanto Earthquake”] in Rekishi Hyo¯ron [歴史評論], vol. 521 (August 1993), 22.
51) Ibid.
52) Quoted in Yamada Sho¯ji, “Kanto¯ Daishinsai ji no Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsujiken Saiban to Gyakusatsu
Sekinin no Yukue” [“関東大震災時の朝鮮人虐殺事件裁判と虐殺責任のゆくえ Trials for Massacre of
Koreans at the Time of the Great Kanto Earthquake and the Responsibility for the Massacre”] in Zai-
Nichi Cho¯senjinshi Undo¯, vol. 20 (October 1990), 81.
53) Aikoku Do¯shi Engokai, ed., Kankoku dokuritsu undo¯ shi [韓国独立運動史 A History of Korean
Independence Movement].  Quoted in Kanto¯ Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin, 338–41.
54) Quoted in Kanto¯ Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin, 426–7.
55) Fuse Tatsuji 布施辰治, “Senjin Sawagi no Cho¯sa” [“朝鮮人騒ぎの調査 Survey Concerning the Korean
Problem”] in Nihon Bengoshi Kyo¯kai Rokuji: Taisho¯ 13 nen 9 gatsu [日本弁護士協会録事：大正十三年九
月 Record of the Japan Lawyers Association in September, 1924].  Quoted in Kanto¯ Daishinsai to
Cho¯senjin, 587–588.
56) Jiji Shimpo¯ 時事新報, 21 October 1923.  Quoted in Taisho¯ Nyu¯su Jiten dai 6 kan: Taisho¯ 12 nen–Taisho¯ 13
nen [大正ニュース事典第六巻：大正十二年―大正十三年 Dictionaries of Taisho News, vol. 6:
1923–1924] (Tokyo: Mainichi Komyunike¯shonzu, 1988), 168–9 (hereafter referred to as Taisho¯ Nyu¯su
Jiten).
57) Ibid.
125
58) Shiho¯sho¯ [司法省 Japan’s Ministry of Justice], ed., Shinsaigo ni okeru Keijijihan oyobi Koreni Kansuru Jiko
Cho¯sasho: Senjin no Hanzai [震災後に於ける刑事事犯及之に関聯する事項調査書：朝鮮人の犯罪 A
Matter Examination Document of Criminal Case and Its Related Ones after the Earthquake: Crime by
Koreans].  Quoted in Kanto¯ Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin, 420–426.
59) Ibid.  The failure of the police to identify many Korean suspects does not necessarily mean that they
lost its grip on the Korean community in Japan.  According to Imai and Saitô, members of the Korean
Section (Naisengakari 内鮮係) in the Tokyo M.P.D. had detained 168 Koreans in “reception centers”
within just a few hours after a direction to protect Koreans was issued.  See Imai and Saito¯, “Daishinsai
to Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsu no Kyu¯mei,” in Rekishi no Shinjitsu, 45–6.
60) Matsuo, “Kanto¯ Daishinsai ka no Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsu Jiken, jo¯,” 45–6.
61) To¯kyo¯ Nichinichi newspaper, 13 September 1923.  Quoted in Kang, Kanto¯ Daishinsai, 41.
62) See, for example, Kang, Kanto¯ Daishinsai, 31–60.
63) Weiner, The Origins of the Korean Community in Japan 1910–1923, 186.
64) To¯kyo¯ Asahi newspaper, 9 October 1923.  Quoted in Kang, Kanto¯ Daishinsai, 17.
65) Jiji Shimpo¯, 15 September 1923.  Quoted in Kang, Kanto¯ Daishinsai, 18.
66) The Peace Preservation Act was designed to punish any person who instigated others to acts of
sedition or endangering the lives, physical safety, property of the public by any means, or spread
rumors harmful to public order.  See Kanto¯ Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin, 75.  In the previous year (1922), the
Japanese government proposed to the Diet so-called Peace Preservation Law (Chian Iji Ho¯ 治安維持法)
to deal with socialist movements within the country.  This proposal met with strong opposition from
both Houses and was rejected.  
67) On 3 September Home Ministry Police Affairs Bureau notified Japan’s newspapers that since any
rumors about a Korean riot would only increase social unrest, the publication of articles concerning
Koreans would culminate in a ban on the sale and distribution of the offending newspaper.  It was not
until 20 October that the Japanese government lifted censorship on publication of newspaper and
magazine articles dealing with the Korean issue.  See Matsuo, “Kanto¯ Daishinsai kano Cho¯senjin
Gyakusatsu Jiken, jo¯,” 56.  
68) Home Ministry, ed., “Shinsai ni tomonau Cho¯senjin Hogo Shu¯yo¯jin’in Shirabe” [“震災に伴う朝鮮人
保護収容人員調 Studies of the Number of Protected Koreans at the time of the Earthquake”].  Quoted
in Kancho¯ Shiryo¯, 23–6.
69) Kanto¯ Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin, 264–5.  On 3 September Pak Yõl and other radical student leaders were
housed in the Setagaya 世田谷, Yodobashi 淀橋 and other police stations in Tokyo.  See Hsü, “Boku
Retsu Jiken,” 379–411.
70) Iwarenaku Korosareta Hitobito, 116–31.
71) Iwamura, Zai-Nichi Chôsenjin to Nihon Ro¯do¯sha Kaikyu¯, 93–4.
72) Imai and Saito¯, “Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsu no Kyu¯mei,” in Rekishi no Shinjitsu, pp. 36–8.
73) Chishikijin no Hanno¯, vol. 1, p. 10.  Also see Kanto¯ Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin, 183.  Hijikata Umeko 土方梅
子, “Hijikata Umeko Jiden” [“土方梅子自伝 Autobiography of Hijikata Umeko”] (Tokyo: Hayakawa
Shobo¯, 1976).  Quoted in Chishikijin no Hanno¯, vol. 2, 494–5.
74) On the other hand, there was an attempt on the part of a fanatic Japanese group to kill the noted
socialist Yamakawa Hitoshi 山川均.  See Yamakawa Kikue 山川菊枝, “Onna Nidai no Ki” [“女二代の
記 An Account of A Woman over Two Generation”] (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1972).  Quoted in Chishikijin
no Hanno¯, vol. 2, 487–8.
75) Matsuo, “Kanto¯ Daishinsai kano Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsu Jiken, jo¯,” 57.
76) The Police Department of the Emergency Earthquake Relief Bureau [臨時震災救護事務局警備部
Rinji Shinsai Kyu¯go Jimukyoku Keibibu], “Cho¯sen Mondai ni Kansuru Kyo¯tei” [“朝鮮問題に関する協定
Policy Concerning the Korean Problem”].  Quoted in Kanto¯  Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin, 79–80.  For
example, Army Colonel Izome Rokuro¯ 井染六郎 is reported to have argued that “there appears to
have been a conspiracy involving socialists and Russian radicals behind the recent seditious acts of
Korean malcontents.”  See Izome Rokuro¯井染六郎, “Konkai no Futei Senjin no Ko¯do¯” [“今回の不逞
鮮人の行動 The Recent Behaviour of Korean Malcontents”] in Shimotsuke newspaper, 7 September
1923.  Quoted in Chishikijin no Hanno¯, vol. 1, 46.
77) Serizawa Mitsuyoshi 芹沢光治良, “Ushinawareta Hito” [“失われた人 Lost Persons”] in Ningen no
126
Ummei dai 5 kan Ushinawareta Hito [人間の運命第 5 巻　失われた人 Fate of Man, vol. 5, Lost
Persons].  Quoted in Chishikijin no Hanno¯, vol. 2, 475–6.
78) Eguchi, “Kanto¯ Daishinsai Kaiso¯ki” in Chishikijin no Hanno¯, vol. 2, 443.
79) Hasegawa Nyozekan 長谷川如是閑, “Rugen to Bo¯ko¯ no Shakai teki Seishitsu” [“流言と暴行の社会的
性質 The Social Nature of Rumor and Violence”] in Warera [我等], the Combined Issue of November
and December of 1923.  Quoted in Chishikijin no Hanno¯, vol. 1, 141.
80) Zai-Nichi Senjindan 在日鮮人団, “Kiokuseyo, Waga Do¯ho¯ Nihonjin yo!  Mizuno Rentaro¯ to Akaike
Atsushi towo!” [“記憶せよ我が同胞日本人よ！　水野簾太郎と赤池濃とを！　Our Comrades
Japanese, Remember Mizuno and Akaike!”] in Saito¯ Makoto Bunsho 9 [斉藤実文書第九巻 Collected
Materials of Saito¯ Makoto, vol. 9] (Seoul: Koryo¯ So¯rim, 1990), 892–4.
127
